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THE RACIAL EVOLUTION OF JUSTICE
KENNEDY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR LAW,
THEORY, AND THE END OF THE SECOND
RECONSTRUCTION
Luis Fuentes-Rohwer*
2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1473
ABSTRACT
This Article examines the recent turn in Justice Kennedy's race
jurisprudence. The shift is palpable, from a narrow and
uncompromising approach to the use of race by state actors to a
more nuanced and contextual understanding of the role that race
plays in American society. This is no small change, best explained by
Justice Kennedy 's status on the Court as a "super median. " This is a
position ofpower and influence, as any majority coalition must count
on Justice Kennedy's vote; but more importantly, it is also a position
of true independence. Justice Kennedy entertains his idiosyncratic
and very personal views on the questions of the day because he can.
He can even contradict himself
Far more important than pinpointing the reasons for Justice
Kennedy's newfound jurisprudential awareness are the implications
of this shift. This Article examines three implications. First, litigators
must learn Kennedy-speak and whatever issues occupy the Justice's
attention. Second, a constitutional world where one justice single-
handedly controls constitutional doctrine places grave stress on the
moral legitimacy ofjudicial review. This is the counter-majoritarian
difficulty on steroids. Finally, the implications for constitutional law
are severe. In particular, this Article argues that the fate of the
Second Reconstruction hinges on the idealism of Justice Kennedy.
Reflecting on the Court's 2010 October Term, this Article concludes
that the Second Reconstruction-and particularly the Voting Rights
Act, the crown jewel of the civil rights movement-appears safe for
now.
* Professor of Law, Indiana University Maurer School of Law.
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"It's Justice Anthony Kennedy's country-the rest of us just
live in it."'
INTRODUCTION
In his concurring opinion in Georgia v. Ashcroft,2 Justice
Kennedy warned that "considerations of race that would doom a
redistricting plan under the Fourteenth Amendment or § 2 [of the
Voting Rights Act] seem to be what save it under § 5 [of the Act]." 3
As the present case did not raise this issue, the Court could avoid it
for the moment. But he made clear that the Court must confront this
1. Noah Feldman, The United States of Justice Kennedy, BLOOMBERG
VIEW (May 31, 2011, 9:52 AM), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2011-05-
30/how-it-became-the-united-states-of-justice-kennedy-noah-feldman.
2. 539 U.S. 461 (2003).
3. Id. at 491 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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"fundamental flaw" in the future. More recently, in his concurring
opinion in Ricci v. DeStefano,4 Justice Scalia similarly warned that
the Court's resolution in Ricci "merely postpones the evil day on
which the Court will have to confront the question: Whether, or to
what extent, are the disparate-impact provisions of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 consistent with the Constitution's guarantee
of equal protection?" 5 To his mind, "the war between disparate
impact and equal protection will be waged sooner or later, and it
behooves us to begin thinking about how-and on what terms-to
make peace between them."6 He underscored that this was not an
easy question.
The future is here. In two recent cases, the Court began to
examine, in ways it has never examined before, the constitutionality
of the Second Reconstruction. The first case, Shelby County v.
Holder, considered the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act.7
Chief Justice Roberts's opinion for the Court struck down the Act's
coverage formula and by implication cast grave doubts on the future
of our civil rights edifice.' The second case, Texas Department of
Housing & Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project,
Inc., considered the constitutional viability of the disparate impact
test.9 After Shelby County, a case best explained as a crass exercise in
judicial attitudinalism,o the continued constitutionality of the Second
Reconstruction was grim. But in a surprising 5-4 opinion, Justice
Kennedy concluded that disparate-impact claims were cognizable
under the Fair Housing Act." It would appear, contra Shelby County,
that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and § 2 of the Voting
Rights Act are safe, at least in the short term. How can this apparent
shift be explained?
For clues, consider the 2006 Term and the notorious and deeply
fractured Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School
District No. 1 decision.1 2 Few decisions have garnered as much
attention in the last few years as Parents Involved. In an opinion
4. 557 U.S. 557 (2009).
5. Id. at 594 (Scalia, J., concurring).
6. Id. at 595-96.
7. 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
8. See id. at 2630-31.
9. 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2513 (2015).
10. See Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, State's Rights, Last
Rites, and Voting Rights, 47 CONN. L. REV. 481, 520-21 (2014).
11. Tex. Dep't ofHous. & Cmty. Affairs, 135 S. Ct. at 2525.
12. 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
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authored by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court struck down two
voluntary racial integration plans for public schools in Louisville and
Seattle.1 3 But only a plurality of justices would go as far as to
prohibit any use of race in student assignments.1 4 Justice Kennedy
provided the fifth vote yet refused to go quite that far. In a separate
concurrence, he left open some room for school boards to consider
the use of race in student assignments while pursuing the goal of
integration. 5 This is the aspect of Kennedy's opinion that strikes a
familiar chord. He is comfortably in the middle, wielding inordinate
power and control as the Court's "super median." 6 This is also
where the familiarities end.
To read Justice Kennedy's opinion in Parents Involved is to see
a side of the Justice we have not seen before. This is true from the
first paragraph of his opinion:
The Nation's schools strive to teach that our strength comes from people
of different races, creeds, and cultures uniting in commitment to the
freedom of all. In these cases two school districts in different parts of the
country seek to teach that principle by having classrooms that reflect the
racial makeup of the surrounding community. That the school districts
consider these plans to be necessary should remind us our highest
aspirations are yet unfulfilled. 7
This opening salvo highlights Justice Kennedy's posture in his
concurrence. The framing is inescapable. Take, for example, his
view later in the opinion that "[t]he enduring hope is that race should
not matter; the reality is that too often it does."" In direct response to
the plurality's pithy phrase that "[t]he way to stop discrimination on
the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race,"'
Kennedy argues that "[flifty years of experience since Brown v.
Board ofEducation should teach us that the problem before us defies
so easy a solution."2 0 Kennedy even takes on Justice Harlan's dissent
in Plessy v. Ferguson and the view that "[o]ur Constitution is color-
13. Id.
14. See id. at 725-33, 745-48.
15. See id. at 787-90 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
16. See Lee Epstein & Tonja Jacobi, Super Medians, 61 STAN. L. REV. 37
(2008).
17. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 782 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
18. Id at 787.
19. Id. at 748 (plurality opinion).
20. Id. at 788 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (citation omitted).
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blind."2 ' This statement often stands at the heart of conservative
attacks on race conscious measures. Yet Kennedy argues that while
justified in the racialized context of the late-nineteenth century, it is
not justified today as anything more than an aspiration. "In the real
world, it is regrettable to say, it cannot be a universal constitutional
principle."22
These arguments should surprise anyone familiar with Justice
Kennedy's race jurisprudence. In his concurring opinion in City of
Richmond v. JA. Croson Co.,23 for example, Justice Kennedy wrote
that "[t]he moral imperative of racial neutrality is the driving force of
the Equal Protection Clause."2 4 In saying this, he counseled that the
use of race by the state must only be "a last resort."25 Similarly, in his
dissenting opinion in Grutter v. Bollinger,2 6 he referred to the use of
race by the state as a "corrosive category"2 7 and argued that:
Preferment by race, when resorted to by the State, can be the most divisive
of all policies, containing within it the potential to destroy confidence in
the Constitution and in the idea of equality. The majority today refuses to
be faithful to the settled principle of strict review designed to reflect these
28
concerns.
These are hardly isolated instances. Over the course of his long
tenure on the bench, Justice Kennedy has demonstrated time and
again that his approach to the use of race by the state is narrow,
formalistic, and one that ultimately renders the state action at issue
unconstitutional.29
The contrast between these two judicial approaches to the use
of race by the state is palpable. But it is more than just the explicit
words that Justice Kennedy uses to express his views; it is the spirit
in which he writes them and the tenor of his opinions. To read his
early opinions on race is to see an unyielding skepticism about the
use of race by the state. This is true across contexts, whether college
21. Id
22. Id
23. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
24. Id at 518 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
25. Id at 519.
26. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
27. Id at 394 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
28. Id at 388.
29. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 927-28 (1995); Presley v. Etowah
Cty. Comm'n, 502 U.S. 491, 509-10 (1992); Grutter, 539 U.S. at 395 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting); Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 592-93 (2009).
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admissions, 30 employment,31 set-asides, 32 or redistricting.33 But his
more recent opinions-of which both Parents Involved 4 and
Inclusive Communities Project are appropriate examples-cannot be
similarly catalogued. The racial skepticism remains, to be sure, but it
is a skepticism now tempered by a far different view of the world
and of the role that race plays within it, both as historical artifact and
social reality. Even as he joined the judgment of the Court in Parents
Involved, for example, Justice Kennedy wrote that "[t]his Nation has
a moral and ethical obligation to fulfill its historic commitment to
creating an integrated society that ensures equal opportunity for all
of its children." 3 5 Similarly, in LULAC v. Perry, a case that examined
the notorious mid-census political gerrymander in Texas,36 Justice
Kennedy concluded that the decision to dismantle a district where
Latino voters would soon achieve majority status violated the Voting
Rights Act.37 This was a remarkable departure for Justice Kennedy,
not the least of which because this was the first time during his
tenure on the Court when he voted to find a statutory violation under
the Act.38 What makes his LULAC opinion "striking" 39 is the reason
he offered for his conclusion: that the state had only decided to break
up the old District 23 when Latinos within it "had found an
efficacious political identity." 40 This is a remarkable position for a
justice who held a strong anti-essentialist view on questions of race
as late as 2001.41
30. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 394 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
31. See Ricci, 557 U.S. at 563.
32. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 518 (1989)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Metro Broad., Inc.
v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 631 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
33. See Miller, 515 U.S. at 903.
34. For a terrific analysis of Justice Kennedy's opinion in Parents Involved,
see Kevin Brown, Reflections on Justice Kennedy's Opinion in Parents Involved:
Why Fifty Years ofExperience Shows Kennedy Is Right, 59 S.C. L. REV. 735 (2008).
35. 551 U.S. 701, 797 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
36. 548 U.S. 399, 409 (2006).
37. Id. at 438-39, 442.
38. Heather K. Gerken, Justice Kennedy and the Domains of Equal
Protection, 121 HARV. L. REV. 104, 109 (2007).
39. Id.
40. LULAC, 548 U.S. at 435.
41. I refer here to Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 267 (2001) (Thomas,
J., dissenting). This argument assumes that Justice Kennedy still held the views he
expressed first in Metro Broadcasting and as late as 1996 in his majority opinion in
Miller. Easley is only the last installment in the Shaw-Miller line of cases, which are
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Can these disparate jurisprudential accounts be reconciled?
One obvious explanation focuses on Justice Kennedy's status as
swing voter. This is a powerful argument. With Justice O'Connor
safely occupying the swing chair, Justice Kennedy could vote his
true preferences because his vote was not determinative to the final
outcome in cases that mattered. It is only upon O'Connor's
retirement that Justice Kennedy's views begin to shift. In this vein,
consider what Adam Cohen wrote at the end of the Court's 2006
Term:
Perhaps most important, it is not yet clear how Justice Kennedy will be
changed by his vastly expanded influence. Justice O'Connor was very
aware of her position as the swing justice, and it made her deeply aware of
the impact her votes had on real people's lives. Justice Kennedy may
inherit that mantle of concern. It is one thing to argue in dissent that
campaign finance laws violate the First Amendment. It is quite another to
cast the vote that prevents a nation weary of lobbying scandals from trying
to clean up its elections.42
This same argument may be applied to Justice Kennedy's equal
protection jurisprudence. Once he came to the middle and the
outcome of some of the most hotly contested policy questions hinged
on his vote, the stakes changed. His jurisprudence changed
accordingly.
This is a persuasive explanation, but only to a point. Swing
justices are often pragmatists, putting together opinions that will
satisfy a majority of five. This is one way to explain Justice
O'Connor's opinion in Grutter, for example, or Justice Powell's
opinion in Regents of the University of Calfornia v. Bakke, as
triumphs in pragmatism. But Justice Kennedy is hardly a pragmatist,
but an idealist. His opinions in LULAC and Parents Involved clearly
suggest as much.43 Justice Kennedy is not looking for the lowest
common denominator among the justices but is instead able to reach
for the stars and write exactly the opinion he wishes to write
unencumbered by the noise from neighboring chambers. His cultural
grounded in a strong anti-essentialist rationale. See Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Race,
Redistricting, and Representation, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1185, 1194 (2007).
42. Adam Cohen, Anthony Kennedy Is Ready for His Close-Up, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 3, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/03/opinion/03mon4.html?scp=
10&sq=justice+kennedy+swing+vote&st=nyt.
43. See Gerken, supra note 38, at 105.
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worldview drives his analysis,' as well as the particular legal domain
under which the facts of the case arise.4 5
Thus the question at the heart of this Article: how to explain
Justice Kennedy's apparent evolution on race questions? In his early
days on the Court, Justice Kennedy followed a narrow and
formalistic colorblind path when interpreting the Fourteenth
Amendment.46 He continued with this approach up to 2003, as seen
in his dissent in Grutter.4 7 But something changed around 2006. This
is when Kennedy became the Court's resident super median. It is
hardly a coincidence that his newfound voice on questions of race
began the term after Justice O'Connor's retirement. But that is
precisely why domains and his cultural worldview have any bite at
all. Once Justice Kennedy achieved super median status, he could let
his aspirations and idealism run free, untethered by the preferences
and idealism of others. In other words, Kennedy's opinions are not
those of a pragmatist because they do not have to be. This is
attitudinalism with a vengeance.
But this is only part of the story. As this Article explains below,
swing justices-and particularly super medians-do not behave as
freely and as independently as we think. This is an interesting
paradox. The more freedom and independence a justice accrues as
she moves towards the status of median justice, the more than public
opinion influences her decisions. Justice Kennedy's shift on race, in
other words, is driven by public opinion. Thinking about Justice
Kennedy as super median thus raises interesting questions about the
status of public opinion and race in contemporary American society.
Far more important than pinpointing the reasons for Kennedy's
newfound jurisprudential awareness are the implications of this shift.
This Article discusses three such implications. First, Kennedy's shift
has direct implications for constitutional litigation and the civil rights
bar. Litigators must learn to speak in the language that now occupies
Justice Kennedy's attention. Second, the shift has important
implications for constitutional theory. The moral case against judicial
review is powerful enough in the abstract.48 The charge becomes
44. See Pamela S. Karlan, The Law ofSmall Numbers: Gonzalez v. Carhart,
Parents Involved in Community Schools, and Some Themes from the First Full
Term of the Roberts Court, 86 N.C. L. REv. 1369 (2008).
45. See Gerken, supra note 38, at 107.
46. See Akhil Reed Amar & Neal Kumar Katyal, Bakke 's Fate, 43 UCLA
L. REV. 1745, 1758 (1996).
47. Grutter v. Bolinger, 539 U.S. 306, 395 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
48. See JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT (1999).
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almost unanswerable under a prism where a singular justice is able to
single-handedly influence the future of the most pressing policy
questions of our generation in accordance to his particular idealism
and cultural worldview. This is a very serious charge against the
institution of judicial review, a charge that demands an answer.
Finally, and in line with the previous critique, Kennedy's shift has
direct implications for constitutional law. This is because the end of
the Second Reconstruction essentially hinges on the idealism and
worldview of Justice Kennedy. This final section parses through
Justice Kennedy's jurisprudence for clues on his thinking about this
particular domain.
This is a story in three Parts. Part I examines the evolving
jurisprudence of Justice Kennedy on questions of race. Part II
explains this evolution as a direct result of Justice Kennedy's
position on the Court as a super median. Finally, Part III discusses
the three leading implications of this argument.
I. THE EVOLVING RACE JURISPRUDENCE OF JUSTICE KENNEDY
Something is amiss in Justice Kennedy's race jurisprudence.
Go back to his early days on the Court, the days of City ofRichmond
v. JA. Croson Co.,4 Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,` Presley v.
Etowah County Commission," and Rice v. Cayetano,52 and you
cannot miss the uncompromising and narrow nature of his approach
to the use of race by the state. This is true both as a question of
constitutional law and when interpreting federal statutes. But the
story has begun to shift in recent years. In both LULAC and Parents
Involved, Justice Kennedy is far more nuanced and compromising in
his approach to the use of race. These decisions cannot be reconciled
with Kennedy's early decisions. The Justice is clearly undergoing a
shift in his thinking as reflected in his written opinions. This first
Part details this shift.
49. 488 U.S. 469, 518 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
50. 497 U.S. 547, 631-38 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
51. 502 U.S. 491, 509-10 (1992).
52. 528 U.S. 495, 523-24 (2000).
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A. First Pass: City ofRichmond, Metro Broadcasting, and Race
Neutrality, 1989-2000
In his early years on the Court, Justice Kennedy displayed a
clear suspicion of any use of race by the state, as reflected in his
uncompromising application of strict scrutiny across settings and
contexts. This was true whether the governmental entity in question
was a state, a local government, or any branch of the national
government. This was also true even if the racial classification was
benign in nature, designed to benefit historically underrepresented
minorities. To Justice Kennedy, all uses of race must be catalogued
under the same rubric, irrespective of the motive behind its
implementation. Jim Crow laws, South African apartheid laws, and
affirmative action policies were one and the same. Context and
history meant nothing.
His first pass at the question came in City of Richmond v. JA.
Croson Co. 5 3 In the case, the Court considered whether a 30% racial
set-aside policy by the Richmond city council could withstand
constitutional scrutiny.54 This was not by any reasonable measure an
easy case. The first obvious difficulty centered on the proper
standard of review for laws intended to benefit members of
underrepresented racial groups.5 The case also forced the Court to
confront the legacy of discrimination in the South and the steps that
state and local governments may take in compliance with the Equal
Protection Clause to remedy this legacy. 56 A final difficulty focused
on the set-aside policy at the heart of the case. 7 This was a classic
and expected outcome of a political struggle as seen every day in
American politics. Could the Court strike down this particular
bargain under the guise of upholding a prior constitutional
compromise intended to bring former slaves into full citizenship
status?
The conservative majority on the Court had very little difficulty
striking down the Richmond set-aside policy.58 In a lead opinion
authored by Justice O'Connor, the Court concluded that the use of
race by the state must be subject to strict scrutiny.59 This was true
53. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
54. Id. at 476-78.
55. Id. at 493-95.
56. Id. at 498-99.
57. See id. at 507-08.
58. Id. at 511.
59. Id. at 493-95.
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irrespective of the stated intentions of those who enacted the policies
and regardless of the source of the policy.60 In fact, in this particular
case, the majority found reason to be distrustful of the political body
behind the policy because the Richmond city council had a majority-
black membership.6 1 Accordingly, "[t]he concern that a political
majority will more easily act to the disadvantage of a minority based
on unwarranted assumptions or incomplete facts would seem to
militate for, not against, the application of heightened judicial
scrutiny in this case."62 The Court was also unpersuaded by the
context in the case and the fact that this was an attempt by the city of
Richmond to address its own legacy of discrimination.6 3 This point
elicited a spirited response from Justice Marshall, who argued in
dissent that:
Our cases in the areas of school desegregation, voting rights, and
affirmative action have demonstrated time and again that race is
constitutionally germane, precisely because race remains dismayingly
relevant in American life.
In adopting its prima facie standard for States and localities, the majority
closes its eyes to this constitutional history and social reality.64
Justice Kennedy concurred in the case, for two reasons. First,
with Justice Scalia, he agreed that the principle of race neutrality lies
as the moral imperative behind the command of equal protection. 65
And yet, he did not sign on to Justice Scalia's opinion, which
adopted a bright-line rule of striking down all racial preferences that
are not designed to remedy prior unlawful acts of racial
discrimination.66 Instead, he wrote separately to underscore his
agreement with Justice O'Connor's adoption of a strict scrutiny
test.67 He did so because he was "not convinced" that Scalia's rigid
test was necessary "at this point." 68 He was also "confident" that the
60. Id. at 500-01.
61. Id. at 495-96.
62. Id. (citing John Hart Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial
Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 723, 739 n.58 (1974) ("Of course it works both
ways: a law that favors Blacks over Whites would be suspect if it were enacted by a
predominantly Black legislature.")).
63. Croson, 488 U.S. at 498-99.
64. Id. at 558 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 518 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
66. Id. at 518-19.
67. Id. at 519.
68. Id.
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strict scrutiny test would "in application . . . operate in a manner
generally consistent with the imperative of race neutrality."6 9
There was no nuance here. There was no discussion of context
or history or of the source for the command of racial neutrality. This
was a simplistic, straight-forward concurrence fitting for a sixth
grade civic class audience. Race is dangerous and toxic. It is up to
the Court to ensure that the states use race only in the rarest of
moments and under extenuating circumstances.
Second, Justice Kennedy was not ready to decide whether the
source of the challenged policy mattered for constitutional
purposes. 70 Or, in his words:
The process by which a law that is an equal protection violation when
enacted by a State becomes transformed to an equal protection guarantee
when enacted by Congress poses a difficult proposition for me; but as it is
not before us, any reconsideration of that issue must await some further
CRC71case. 
This was an important concession. It underscores Justice Kennedy's
penchant for deliberate adjudication as demanded by the common
law approach.7 2 But he need not wait too long to decide the question.
The following term, in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, the
Court faced the question Justice Kennedy purposefully left open. 7 3
The case featured a number of racial preferences adopted by the
Federal Communications Commission and endorsed by Congress in
the assigning or transfer of broadcasting licenses to minority-owned
firms. 74 In an opinion authored by Justice Brennan, the Court
surprisingly upheld the federal program as consistent with equal
protection principles.7 ' The first line of the opinion spoke volumes
about the Court's posture in the case: "The policies before us today
can best be understood by reference to the history of federal efforts
to promote minority participation in the broadcasting industry." 76
Consequently, the Court held that race-conscious plans directed by
the federal government must serve important governmental goals and
69. Id.
70. Id at 518.
71. Id.
72. See also id. at 519 ("Nevertheless, given that a rule of automatic
invalidity for racial preferences in almost every case would be a significant break
with our precedents that require a case-by-case test, I am not convinced we need
adopt it at this point.").
73. 497 U.S. 547, 552 (1990).
74. Id. at 552, 584.
75. Id. at 552.
76. Id. at 552-53.
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must be substantially related to those goals." The Court concluded
that the plan in question met this standard of review."
Justice Kennedy, in an opinion joined by Justice Scalia,
dissented." This is a noteworthy opinion for at least two reasons.
First, the narrow window that Justice Kennedy appeared to leave
open in Croson-on the question of the proper standard of review for
race conscious plans enacted by Congress-was closed emphatically
in Metro Broadcasting. All uses of race, whether by the federal
government or the states, are subject to strict scrutiny. This is
noteworthy because it offers a glimpse into Justice Kennedy's
approach to constitutional adjudication. It would be hard to believe
that he would have reached a different answer to this question the
prior term. But he did not answer the question because it was not
properly presented.
Second, one cannot escape the ease with which Justice
Kennedy analogized the plan under review to the most derided cases
and regimes of the last hundred years. His begins with Plessy and
argues that its "standard of review and its explication have disturbing
parallels to today's majority opinion that should warn us something
is amiss here."" In reference to the need under the policy to define
which racial minorities are included as beneficiaries, Kennedy quotes
Justice Stewart's dissent in Fullilove v. Klutznick that "[i]f the
National Government is to make a serious effort to define racial
classes by criteria that can be administered objectively, it must study
precedents such as the First Regulation to the Reichs Citizenship
Law of November 14, 1935, translated in 4 Nazi Conspiracy and
Aggression, Document No. 1417-PS, pp. 8-9 (1946)."'l Justice
Kennedy also makes use of Korematsu v. United States and South
Africa's apartheid laws.82
77. Id. at 564-65.
78. Id. at 566.
79. Id. at 631 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 632.
81. Id. at 633 n.1 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 534 n.5
(1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting)).
82. See id. at 633, 635. In response, the majority "fail[s] to understand how
Justice KENNEDY can pretend that examples of 'benign' race-conscious measures
include South African apartheid, the 'separate-but-equal' law at issue in Plessy v.
Ferguson, . .. and the internment of American citizens of Japanese ancestry upheld
in Korematsu v. United States." Id. at 564 n.12 (majority opinion) (citations
omitted). And more importantly, the majority is just as confident as Justice Kennedy
is not that "an examination of the legislative scheme and its history will separate
benign measures from other types of racial classifications." Id. (citation omitted).
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Justice Kennedy concludes his short dissent with a passage
worth quoting in full:
Perhaps the Court can succeed in its assumed role of case-by-case arbiter
of when it is desirable and benign for the Government to disfavor some
citizens and favor others based on the color of their skin. Perhaps the
tolerance and decency to which our people aspire will let the disfavored
rise above hostility and the favored escape condescension. But history
suggests much peril in this enterprise, and so the Constitution forbids us to
undertake it. I regret that after a century of judicial opinions we interpret
the Constitution to do no more than move us from "separate but equal" to
"unequal but benign." 83
This passage highlights Justice Kennedy's narrow and acontextual
approach to the use of race by the state. Its lessons are clear. Race is
no more than skin color. Our racial history counsels that the use of
race poses grave dangers. And there is no such thing as benign uses
of race. We use race as a public policy tool at our own peril.
B. Coming into His Own: Miller's Tale, 1993-2003
The 1990 Census and the resulting redistricting season thrust
the Court right in the middle of a very contentious debate over the
role of race in politics.8 4 This debate presented the justices with very
difficult questions of representation. How best to represent the
interests of voters of color as required by the Voting Rights Act? In
other words, how to resolve the inevitable tension between
descriptive representation, which entailed the creation of majority-
minority districts, and substantive representation, which focused on
the election of like-minded representatives irrespective of race?
Complicating matters, the use of race in redistricting has clear and
direct political consequences. This is because racial minorities-and
particularly black voters-are generally Democratic voters. To create
majority-minority districts is to essentially pack Democratic voters.
It is no surprise that Republican strategists prefer these districts,
while Democratic leaders favor the representation of interests.
In the early 1990s, this tension reached the high court. And the
justices failed to impress. The first case, Shaw v. Reno, arose out of
83. Id. at 637-38 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
84. Mark A. Posner, The Real Story Behind the Justice Department's
Implementation of Section 5 of the VRA: Vigorous Enforcement, as Intended by
Congress, 1 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y 79, 106 (2006); Joan Biskupic, N.C.
Case to Pose Test of Racial Redistricting: White Voters Challenge Black Majority
Map, WASH. POST, Apr. 20, 1993, at A4.
85. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
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familiar circumstances. Democratic leaders in North Carolina drew a
state congressional map with only one majority-minority district.8 6
The Department of Justice (DOJ) objected to this first plan and
demanded the creation of a second majority-minority district.17 This
objection stemmed from the authority granted to the DOJ by the
Voting Rights Act." Whether this was the proper reading of the Act
or not, it was clear that the State of North Carolina only drew this
second district when required to do so by federal authorities." But
there were only so many Democratic voters to spread around, so in
order to uphold the gains of the previous plan while complying with
DOJ's reading of the law demanded much cartographical creativity.
In the eyes of the conservative majority on the Court, in fact, the
resulting districts were simply bizarre, too ugly for words, and
clearly unconstitutional. In Justice O'Connor's words:
[W]e believe that reapportionment is one area in which appearances do
matter. A reapportionment plan that includes in one district individuals
who belong to the same race, but who are otherwise widely separated by
geographical and political boundaries, and who may have little in common
with one another but the color of their skin, bears an uncomfortable
resemblance to political apartheid. It reinforces the perception that
members of the same racial group-regardless of their age, education,
economic status, or the community in which they live-think alike, share
the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the
polls. We have rejected such perceptions elsewhere as impermissible
racial stereotypes. 90
A few things jump right off from this passage. First, note the
allusion to apartheid once again. The analogy is particularly inapt
here, since the districts at issue were some of the most integrated
districts in the country and a near-perfect reflection of the racial
composition of the state as a whole.9' Second, the anti-essentialist
impulse could not be clearer. People must be treated by the state as
individuals and not members of groups, and they must not be
stereotyped into roles and ascribed identities that they have not
chosen for themselves.
Third, it is important that the Court paid no attention to the
context under which this case arose and the empirical realities on the
86. Id. at 633.
87. Id. at 635.
88. Id. at 634-35.
89. Id. at 635.
90. Id. at 647.
91. See Pamela S. Karlan, All Over the Map: The Supreme Court's Voting
Rights Trilogy, 1993 SUP. CT. REv. 245, 282.
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ground. The fact that the state had been forced to draw the second
district, or the fact that the pressure had come under DOJ's particular
reading of the Voting Rights Act, proved irrelevant. The Court
majority had its own particular story, and it was sticking to it.
Finally, it is crucial that the facts in Shaw did not fit traditional
conceptions of constitutional harm in the voting rights context as
then understood. That is, the facts fit neither vote dilution nor vote
denial claims. This was something completely different, unless it was
not different at all. The Court held that the use of race in redistricting
violates equal protection principles when "a reapportionment plan
rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to
segregate citizens into separate voting districts on the basis of race
without sufficient justification."9 2 In so holding, the Court conceded
that this claim was "analytically distinct"9 3 from traditional equal
protection claims. The claim soon came to be known as an
"expressive harm."94 The reach of this inquiry, at least in 1993,
appeared boundless.
Soon after Shaw, it was open season on majority-minority
districts. Or so it appeared. The question for the future was whether
the Shaw inquiry demanded the existence of bizarre districts, as
Justice O'Connor's language strongly suggested. But the Court
forged a new path in the very next case. In Miller v. Johnson, the
Court confronted a districting scheme that resembled the traditional
districts of old.9 5 The context was eerily similar: a districting plan, a
DOJ objection, and the creation of a new majority black district.96
What this plan lacked was a bizarre district in the mold of Shaw.9 7 In
an opinion authored by Justice Kennedy, however, the Court
explained that "bizarreness is [not] a necessary element of the
constitutional wrong or a threshold requirement of proof "9' Rather,
shape is important "because it may be persuasive circumstantial
evidence that race for its own sake, and not other districting
principles, was the legislature's dominant and controlling rationale in
92. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 652.
93. Id.
94. See Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre
Districts, " and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw
v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483, 506-07 (1993).
95. 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
96. Id. at 906-07.
97. Id. at 905-06.
98. Id. at 913.
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drawing its district lines."99 This was the genesis, two years after
Shaw, of the predominant factor test.
In concluding, Justice Kennedy offered an ode to the anti-
essentialist principle at the heart of his opinion:'0 0
The [Voting Rights] Act, and its grant of authority to the federal courts
to uncover official efforts to abridge minorities' right to vote, has been of
vital importance in eradicating invidious discrimination from the electoral
process and enhancing the legitimacy of our political institutions. Only if
our political system and our society cleanse themselves of that
discrimination will all members of the polity share an equal opportunity to
gain public office regardless of race. As a Nation we share both the
obligation and the aspiration of working toward this end. The end is
neither assured nor well served, however, by carving electorates into racial
blocs. . . . It takes a shortsighted and unauthorized view of the Voting
Rights Act to invoke that statute, which has played a decisive role in
redressing some of our worst forms of discrimination, to demand the very
racial stereotyping the Fourteenth Amendment forbids.101
This conclusion is in line with Shaw in that they both share a
disdain with race essentialism. Both opinions make clear that the
state must not choose political identities for the voters; this is
something that each individual voter must do for herself. Both
opinions are also bome of an idealism that wishes to remove race
from public life. This is true even if the facts on the ground counsel
otherwise and irrespective of the views held by other institutional
actors. The conservative majority holds epistemic authority on this
question under its interpretation of the equality principle. There is no
room for debate.
In the next case in this long and forgettable saga, Justice
Kennedy reinforced his formalism on questions of race and
redistricting. The case was Bush v. Vera.102 Two particular passages
of his concurring opinion intrigue me. The first is the passage where
he argues that the Court "would no doubt apply strict scrutiny if a
State decreed that certain districts had to be at least 50 percent white,
and our analysis should be no different if the State so favors minority
races."1 03 This is an arresting sentence. To be sure, a demand that
districts must be "at least 50 percent white" should strike us as odd
99. Id
100. See id at 911 ("[T]he Government must treat citizens 'as individuals,
not "as simply components of a racial, religious, sexual or national class."' (citation
omitted)).
101. Id at 927-28.
102. 517 U.S. 952 (1996).
103. Id at 996 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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and even bizarre. The world of race and politics as practiced in the
United States would have to evolve dramatically for such a demand
to make any sense at all. I cannot even begin to imagine what such a
world would look like. This is another way of saying that context and
history make all the difference in the world. That Justice Kennedy
uses this passage as a way to clinch his argument that strict scrutiny
is the obvious standard in the case tells us a great deal about his
frame of mind on questions of race in the mid-1990s.
The second is a passage where Justice Kennedy offers as an
example of an unjustified racial district the notion of "gratuitous
race-based districting."104 This would be districting where the state
used race for no particular reason at all. To Justice Kennedy, any use
of race by the state unsupported by a compelling state interest is a
"gratuitous" use of race. This is something that the state must not do.
Without question, this is a very narrow and unforgiving
understanding of race. It is dismissive of our racial history. But more
importantly, it is also the law.
C. A New Leaf: LULAC, Parents Involved, and Inclusive
Communities Project, 2006-2015
As late as 2003, Justice Kennedy continued to hold narrow and
formalistic views on questions of race. In Grutter v. Bollinger, for
example, he argued in dissent that the Michigan Law School's
admissions plan could not survive a proper application of strict
scrutiny.' 5 Echoing the spirit of earlier analogies, he wrote that
"[p]referment by race, when resorted to by the State, can be the most
divisive of all policies, containing within it the potential to destroy
confidence in the Constitution and in the idea of equality."'06 This is
a view of race as a "corrosive category," and one where only a
narrowly tailored policy that pursues a compelling state interest can
meet his standard of fairness.' 7 Above all, as he reiterated
throughout his dissent, his concern was that all applicants must
receive individualized review." This is the same anti-essentialist
sentiment he expressed through the years.
104. Id. at 999.
105. 539 U.S. 306, 388, 391 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 388.
107. See id. at 394 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("Prospective students, the
courts, and the public can demand that the State and its law schools prove their
process is fair and constitutional in every phase of implementation.").
108. See, e.g., id. at 387.
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And then, beginning in 2006, something happened. Justice
Kennedy's views on race "softened." 0 9 Three cases figure
prominently in this metamorphosis. The first case is LULAC v.
Perry, where Justice Kennedy joined the four moderates on the Court
and struck down a legislative district in Texas under § 2 of the
Voting Rights Act." 0 The second case is Parents Involved in
Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, where the Court
struck down voluntary racial integration plans for the public schools
in Louisville and Seattle."' Justice Kennedy wrote a concurring
opinion that looks nothing like his opinions of old. The third case is
Texas Department of Housing & Community Affairs v. Inclusive
Communities Project, Inc., decided this past Term.11 2 This was an
indirect challenge to the Second Reconstruction by way of disparate
impact analysis." 3 In a surprising 5-4 decision, Justice Kennedy
interpreted the Federal Housing Act to incorporate disparate impact
review.1 4 This Section examines these opinions in turn.
1. LULAC and Latino Essentialism
When it comes to Justice Kennedy's views about the Voting
Rights Act, we know two things: first, that he is deeply committed to
an anti-essentialist reading of anti-discrimination law, and the Voting
Rights Act lies at the core of this commitment; and second, that he is
ambivalent about the constitutionality of the Act. Taken together,
these two commitments make Justice Kennedy a reliable vote on the
Court for strict, narrow, and often acontextual readings of the Act." 5
This is also what makes LULAC v. Perry"6 such a puzzling opinion.
This case is worthy of attention because it appears to compromise
both commitments.
In LULAC, the Court faced the mid-decade Texas gerrymander
orchestrated by Congressman Tom DeLay."' In an opinion authored
by Justice Kennedy, the Court struck down one of the challenged
109. Gerken, supra note 38, at 104.
110. 548 U.S. 399 (2006).
111. 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
112. 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See Presley v. Etowah Cty. Comm'n, 502 U.S. 491 (1992); Holder v.
Hall, 512 U.S. 874 (1994).
116. 548 U.S. 399 (2006).
117. See The Texas Gerrymander, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2006), http://www.
nytimes.com/2006/03/01/opinion/0lwed2.html.
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districts under § 2 of the Act."' Incidentally, this was the first time in
the history of the Act that the Court had so held under § 2. In order to
reach this conclusion, Justice Kennedy must face his anti-essentialist
reading of anti-discrimination law. He must also confront his long-
standing skepticism about the constitutionality of the Voting Rights
Act. On both of these questions, his published opinion is nothing
short of astounding.
Consider first the anti-essentialist critique. This is the concept
that individuals must be treated as individuals and not as members of
groups. Justice Kennedy is firmly within this camp, as we saw
earlier. And yet, in LULAC, Justice Kennedy was taken by the fact
that the Texas plan had removed Latinos from a particular district
because they were about to achieve a numerical majority and act
against the incumbent Republican congressman, Henry Bonilla."9
This was something that the state could not do.1 20 More importantly,
Justice Kennedy's concern was that "the State took away the
Latinos' opportunity because Latinos were about to exercise it."121
That is to say, Latinos, not Democratic voters, were about to achieve
real political power, and only then would the State step in and ensure
their minority status. In Justice Kennedy's words:
Even if we accept the District Court's finding that the State's action was
taken primarily for political, not racial, reasons, the redrawing of the
district lines was damaging to the Latinos in District 23. The State not
only made fruitless the Latinos' mobilization efforts but also acted against
those Latinos who were becoming most politically active, dividing them
with a district line through the middle of Laredo.1 22
This is a remarkable statement coming from a Justice who
explicitly derides the essentialization of voters of color in the name
of a particular brand of racial justice. This is the same Justice, after
all, who wrote a decade earlier: "When the State assigns voters on
the basis of race, it engages in the offensive and demeaning
assumption that voters of a particular race, because of their race,
'think alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the
same candidates at the polls."1 2 3 In the Shaw cases, treating
118. Id at 447.
119. Id. at 423-25.
120. Id at 442.
121. Id at 440.
122. Id. (citation omitted).
123. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911-12 (1995) (quoting Shaw v. Reno,
509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993)); see Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 636 (1990)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("The perceptions of the excluded class must also be
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Democratic voters as black voters was to engage in demeaning
stereotyping. In LULAC, to treat Latinos as Democratic voters was a
cognizable harm under § 2. Reconciling the tension between the old
Justice Kennedy and the new is difficult if not downright impossible.
One way out of this tension is apparent, yet ultimately flawed.
In the Shaw cases, the plaintiffs argued successfully that the resulting
shape of the majority-minority districts in question was bizarre to the
point of unconstitutionality. As a statutory question, it could be
argued that minority voters in North Carolina's District 12 did not
have a § 2 right to their district. This is because they could not meet
all three of Thornburg v. Gingles's factors.1 2 4 Quite obviously, they
could not meet the first factor, the compactness requirement. The
bizarre nature of the challenged districts made clear that black voters
in District 12 were not "sufficiently large and geographically
compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district."1 25 In
LULAC, however, Justice Kennedy concluded that Latino voters in
the old District 23 held a § 2 right to their district. One could argue
that this conclusion alone renders a comparison between the two
cases inapposite.
To so exonerate Justice Kennedy would be to miss the most
interesting and important part of his opinion in LULAC. To be sure,
Justice Kennedy concluded that Latinos in District 23 held a § 2 right
to their district, a right that the legislature could not take away from
them. But far more telling is how hard he must labor to reach this
conclusion.1 26 The Chief Justice, for one, was not impressed:
Whatever the majority believes it is fighting with its holding, it is not
vote dilution on the basis of race or ethnicity. I do not believe it is our role
to make judgments about which mixes of minority voters should count for
purposes of forming a majority in an electoral district, in the face of
factual findings that the district is an effective majority-minority
district.1 2 7
It is downright impossible to read the Chief Justice's dissent
and not puzzle over what Justice Kennedy might be up to. It may
very well be that he is intent on having a say on the clumsy and
distasteful way in which Republicans, both in Texas and at the
weighed, with attention to the cardinal rule that our Constitution protects each
citizen as an individual, not as a member of a group.").
124. See 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986).
125. Id. at 50.
126. See LULAC v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 423-42 (2006).
127. Id. at 511 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
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national level, conducted themselves.1 28 But it is also true that
whatever his motivations, Justice Kennedy clearly aligned himself
with a view about race in the political context that he abhorred a
decade before. LULAC does not square with Shaw and its progeny.
The second point is equally baffling. Up to his controlling
opinion in LULAC, it is hardly a stretch to consider Justice Kennedy
a foe of the Voting Rights Act in general and racial districts in
particular. Consider in this vein his concurring opinion in Georgia v.
Ashcroft,129 decided in 2003:
As is evident from the Court's accurate description of the facts in this
case, race was a predominant factor in drawing the lines of Georgia's State
Senate redistricting map. If the Court's statement of facts had been written
as the preface to consideration of a challenge brought under the Equal
Protection Clause or under § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, a reader
of the opinion would have had sound reason to conclude that the challenge
would succeed. Race cannot be the predominant factor in redistricting
under our decision in Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 . . . (1995). Yet
considerations of race that would doom a redistricting plan under the
Fourteenth Amendment or § 2 seem to be what save it under § 513
These are not the words of a staunch supporter of the Act but,
rather, the words of one who is waiting for the right moment to strike
it down on constitutional grounds. There can be no other way if the
predominant factor test retains any vitality. This is because any time
§ 2 of the Act is invoked, race will predominate. This was Shaw, and
this was also Miller.
In LULAC, however, race predominated, and unapologetically
so. Yet Justice Kennedy was hardly the skeptic Justice he had been
in the recent past. Instead, no hurdle proved too difficult for him: not
the lower court's findings and the clear error test; 131 not the actual
words of the lower court's opinion;1 3 2 and certainly not the
constitutional concerns that occupied him in the past. The right of
Latinos in District 23 to their district must be vindicated, and Justice
Kennedy joined the moderates and happily put himself up to the task.
128. See Charles, supra note 41.
129. 539 U.S. 461 (2003).
130. Id at 491 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
131. On this point, see LULAC, 548 U.S. at 497 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
132. See id at 498-500.
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2. Parents Involved and the Legacy of Brown
Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Parents Involved in
Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1133 offers a
similarly telling example of Kennedy's evolving equal protection
views. The opinion is vintage Kennedy: School districts can use race
in student assignments, but can only do so as a last resort.13 4 But
Kennedy's concurring opinion is far more important because it
continues with the story of Kennedy's transformation begun in
LULAC. This is not the Kennedy of old, the author of narrow and
inflexible opinions. This is a Justice willing to give complex
constitutional questions their due care. Three arguments deserve
close attention.
The first argument highlights the debate within the Court over
the legacy of Brown. Chief Justice Roberts quoted from the
plaintiffs' briefs in Brown that "the Fourteenth Amendment prevents
states from according differential treatment to American children on
the basis of their color or race."1 3 5 He then asked, "What do the racial
classifications at issue here do, if not accord differential treatment on
the basis of race?"'3 6 Justice Thomas similarly argued that "[r]acial
imbalance is not segregation" and so the school districts in Louisville
and Seattle are not pursuing the constitutional goals of Brown.'3 7
With the Chief Justice, Justice Thomas wrote that the opposite is in
fact true: The reformers in Louisville and Seattle are in the same
moral and constitutional space as the segregationists who defended
segregated school systems in Brown.'3 8
The dissenters took a decidedly different view of history.
Justice Stevens chided the Chief Justice for relying on Brown to
strike down racial balancing plans. More specifically, he argued that
the Chief Justice "rewrites the history of one of th[e] Court's most
important decisions." 3 9 Justice Breyer similarly wrote that:
[I]t is a cruel distortion of history to compare Topeka, Kansas, in the
1950's to Louisville and Seattle in the modem day-to equate the plight of
Linda Brown (who was ordered to attend a Jim Crow school) to the
133. 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
134. Id. at 798 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
135. Id. at 747 (plurality opinion).
136. Id.
137. See id. at 750 (Thomas, J., concurring).
138. See id. at 773-74.
139. Id. at 799 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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circumstances of Joshua McDonald (whose request to transfer to a school
closer to home was initially declined).1 40
Justice Kennedy's jurisprudence places him distinctly within
the first camp, which views Brown and Parents Involved as morally
equivalent. But his concurring opinion in Parents Involved betrays
this understanding of his jurisprudence. His words could not be any
clearer, or any more surprising:
This is by way of preface to my respectful submission that parts of the
opinion by THE CHIEF JUSTICE imply an all-too-unyielding insistence
that race cannot be a factor in instances when, in my view, it may be taken
into account. The plurality opinion is too dismissive of the legitimate
interest government has in ensuring all people have equal opportunity
regardless of their race. The plurality's postulate that "[t]he way to stop
discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of
race," ante, at [40-41], is not sufficient to decide these cases. Fifty years of
experience since Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 .. . (1954),
should teach us that the problem before us defies so easy a solution.
School districts can seek to reach Brown's objective of equal educational
opportunity. The plurality opinion is at least open to the interpretation that
the Constitution requires school districts to ignore the problem of de facto
resegregation in schooling. I cannot endorse that conclusion. To the extent
the plurality opinion suggests the Constitution mandates that state and
local school authorities must accept the status quo of racial isolation in
schools, it is, in my view, profoundly mistaken.141
Justice Kennedy's position is surprising because he is willing
to recognize that the questions facing the Louisville and Seattle
school boards are difficult questions, devoid of simplistic answers.
This is a remarkable shift for a Justice who once agreed with the
view that the creation of bizarre majority-minority districts bore an
uncomfortable resemblance to racial apartheid.1 42
The second argument looks back to the Grutter case and the
diversity rationale. To be sure, the mere use of a prior case as settled
law should hardly qualify as noteworthy. But Kennedy is not simply
accepting Grutter as settled law; rather, he is reversing himself
within the space of four years. 143 Whereas in Grutter he chastised
Justice O'Connor's use of the diversity rationale, in Parents Involved
he suggested that "a district may consider it a compelling interest to
achieve a diverse student population. Race may be one component of
140. Id at 867 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
141. Id at 787-88 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
142. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 648 (1993).
143. See J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Comment, The Seattle and Louisville
School Cases: There Is No Other Way, 121 HARV. L. REv. 158, 170 (2007).
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that diversity, but other demographic factors, plus special talents and
needs, should also be considered."'" Explaining this change is not
easy.
The third argument focuses on what might well be the most
influential conservative canard in history: Justice Harlan's colorblind
language in Plessy v. Ferguson.145 The passage reads as follows:
"Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates
classes among citizens. "146 Conservative jurists and commentators
often turn to this language while criticizing affirmative action and
similar policies as inconsistent with constitutional principles. This is
an argument for the moral equivalence of racial segregation and
racial integration.1 4 7 All uses of race, no matter their motives, are
suspect and presumed unconstitutional. As Chief Justice Roberts
wrote at the close of his opinion in Parents Involved, "The way to
stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on
the basis of race."1 4 8
Criticisms of this line of argument are plentiful, from diverse
quarters.1 49 The one place one would not expect a critique to arise is
Kennedy's chambers. In Parents Involved, however, this is exactly
what Justice Kennedy did. In his words:
The statement by Justice Harlan that "[o]ur Constitution is color-blind"
was most certainly justified in the context of his dissent in Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537, 559 ... (1896). The Court's decision in that case
was a grievous error it took far too long to overrule. Plessy, of course,
concerned official classification by race applicable to all persons who
sought to use railway carriages. And, as an aspiration, Justice Harlan's
axiom must command our assent. In the real world, it is regrettable to say,
it cannot be a universal constitutional principle.150
This is a remarkable statement for any conservative jurist, and
much more so for the jurist who penned Miller v. Johnson and who
continually questions the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act.
144. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 797-98 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment).
145. 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 559.
147. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 773-76 (Thomas, J., concurring).
148. Id. at 748 (plurality opinion).
149. See Ruth Colker, Reflections on Race: The Limits of Formal Equality,
69 OHIO ST. L.J. 1089 (2008); Daniel P. Tokaji, Desegregation, Discrimination and
Democracy: Parents Involved's Disregardfor Process, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 847 (2008).
150. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 788 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment).
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It is aspirational in outlook yet realist in application. This is clearly a
different Justice Kennedy.
3. Inclusive Communities Project and the Vestiges of
Residential Segregation
The conclusion of this last Term brought us more of the same.
In Texas Department of Housing & Community Affairs v. Inclusive
Communities Project, Inc., the Court considered a question that
presaged a much larger debate about the Second Reconstruction. 15 In
a narrow sense, the Court faced a straight-forward question: Are
disparate impact claims cognizable under the Federal Housing
Act?1 5 2 In a 5-4 opinion, Justice Kennedy argued in the
affirmative.1 5 3 I will have much more to say about the implications of
this decision for the Second Reconstruction. For my purposes in this
Subsection, I simply want to note how Justice Kennedy introduced
the issue. This was a legal question for which history and context
mattered.
After the traditional recitation of facts, Kennedy turned
immediately to the history of housing segregation in our country.154
He first offered Buchanan v. Warley, decided in 1917, which
declared de jure housing segregation unconstitutional. '5 5 Kennedy's
next move was significant; just as he recognized that housing
segregation had been unconstitutional for almost a century, he
conceded that its "vestiges remain today, intertwined with the
country's economic and social life."1 56 This was due "to conditions
that arose in the mid-20th century," including "[r]apid urbanization"
and the resulting white flight to the suburbs. 1' Notably, the
government was no mere bystander in all of this:
During this time, various practices were followed, sometimes with
governmental support, to encourage and maintain the separation of the
races: Racially restrictive covenants prevented the conveyance of property
to minorities; steering by real-estate agents led potential buyers to consider
homes in racially homogenous areas; and discriminatory lending practices,
151. See Tex. Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project,
Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2510 (2015).
152. Id.
153. See id.
154. Id. at 2515.
155. 245 U.S. 60, 71, 82 (1917).
156. Tex. Dep't ofHous. & Cmty. Affairs, 135 S. Ct. at 2515.
157. Id.
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often referred to as redlining, precluded minority families from purchasing
homes in affluent areas. 5 8
In due time, these practices led to their expected result. "By the
1960's," Justice Kennedy recognized, "these policies, practices, and
prejudices had created many predominantly black inner cities
surrounded by mostly white suburbs." '59
President Johnson responded to the "considerable social
unrest" by establishing the National Advisory Commission on Civil
Disorders, better known as the Kerner Commission.'6 0 Kennedy
quoted the Commission's report, including its conclusion that "[o]ur
Nation is moving toward two societies, one black, one white-
separate and unequal." 6 ' He also quoted its recommendation about
the need for "a comprehensive and enforceable open-occupancy law
making it an offense to discriminate in the sale or rental of any
housing . . . on the basis of race, creed, color, or national origin."162
In the wake of Dr. King's assassination, Congress responded by
enacting the Commission's recommendations, codified in the Fair
Housing Act.'6 3
Think about Justice Kennedy through the years, and
particularly his uncompromising stance on questions of race. The
early cases made no use of history or context. Plessy is Korematsu is
Brown is Grutter. The use of race by the state was noxious and even
dangerous. Racial classifications may be used only under extreme
circumstances. His cites in this context to the First Regulation to the
Reichs Citizenship Law of November 14, 1935, and South Africa's
apartheid laws are jarring. Beginning in 2006, however, his views
began to soften. This leads me directly to the question of the next
Part: How to explain this metamorphosis?
II. KENNEDY IN THE MIDDLE: THE FACE OF A SUPER MEDIAN
Justice Kennedy's jurisprudence is undergoing a radical
transformation. From his early years on the Court and up until his
dissenting opinion in Grutter, decided in 2003, Justice Kennedy
could not be considered a friend of the civil rights community. But
158. Id. (citation omitted).
159. Id. (citing KENNETH B. CLARK, DARK GHETTO: DILEMMAS OF SOCIAL
POWER 11, 21-26 (1965)).
160. Id. at 2516.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
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things are clearly different, as argued in the previous Part. This Part
explains the shift in relation to Kennedy's status as a super median.
A. What's in a Super Median?
The concept of swing-or median-justice is well ingrained in
our political consciousness. This is the one justice in the Court's
ideological middle, the one vote that decides all the important and
contested cases. Justice O'Connor was widely seen as a swing voter
throughout her years on the Court, and so was Justice Powell.16 4 In
recent years, and particularly since Justice O'Connor's retirement,
Justice Kennedy is now widely considered the Court's swing
Justice.16 5
But not all medians are the same. Consider the fact that Justices
Marshall, Blackmun, and Souter could be considered at one time or
another to have been the Court's median justices.16 Differences in
the power and influence of median justices are captured by the term
"super median."1 6 7 Super medians are those swing justices "who (1)
are crucial to the formation of majority coalitions and, thus, to the
outcome of any given decision and (2) are influential in dictating the
terms of the Court's opinion and, thus, to the formulation of any
precedent it establishes, especially in consequential or otherwise
high-profile decisions."'6 8 In order for a swing justice to achieve the
status of super median, she must be a consistent member of the
majority coalition, and she must also be influential within that
coalition. Put differently, the status of super median is "a function of
the relative proximity between the swing justice and those nearest to
him or her."'69
A justice becomes a super median when two conditions are
met. First, the ideological gap between the median justice and the
justices to her left and to her right on the Court's ideological
continuum grows, so that it is less likely it is that majority opinions
164. Epstein & Jacobi, supra note 16, at 55.
165. See David Cole, The 'Kennedy Court,' THE NATION (July 31, 2006),
http://www.thenation.com/article/kennedy-court/; Adam Liptak, The Roberts Court;
The Most Conservative Court in Decades, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2010, at Al; Dahlia
Lithwick, Swing Time: Anthony Kennedy-The New Sandra Day O'Connor, SLATE
(Jan. 17, 2006, 5:07 PM), http://www.slate.com/toolbar.aspx?action-print&id=2134421.
166. See Epstein & Jacobi, supra note 16, at 54.
167. Id. at 40-41.
168. Id. at 51.
169. Id. at 43.
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can be formed without the median voter.'70 And second, the
"overlap" in the distribution of the preferences of the median justice
and the closest justices decrease."' As the justices' preferences
converge, the more likely it is that majority coalitions can form
without the median.'72 This is exactly what happens to Justice Souter,
the median Justice during the 1991 Term.'73 In contrast, as the
preference distributions diverge, it is less likely that majority
coalitions can form without the swing justice.'74 This is Justice
O'Connor in 2001.' This is also Justice Kennedy in 2006,16 the
Term when the Court decided Parents Involved.
Notably, research suggests that the median swing justice, that
is, "the Justice in the middle of a distribution of Justices,""' is less
driven by ideology than other justices and more by "strategic and
case-specific considerations."" More importantly, these justices'
votes "correspond more closely with public opinion and less with
personal preferences than the other justices. " 9 This finding reminds
me of a cautionary note issued by then-Justice Rehnquist over a
generation ago:
The judges of any court of last resort, such as the Supreme Court of the
United States, work in an insulated atmosphere in their courthouse where
they sit on the bench hearing oral arguments or sit in their chambers
writing opinions. But these same judges go home at night and read the
newspapers or watch the evening news on television; they talk to their
family and friends about current events. Somewhere "out there"-beyond
the walls of the courthouse-run currents and tides of public opinion
which lap at the courthouse door. . . . [I]f these tides of public opinion are
sufficiently great and sufficiently sustained, they will very likely have an
effect upon the decision of some of the cases decided within the
courthouse. . . . Judges, so long as they are relatively normal human
170. Id at 74.
171. Id at 81.
172. Id at 83.
173. Id
174. Id at 85.
175. Id at 85, 87.
176. Epstein and Jacobi identify six super medians beginning in 1953. These
are Justice Clark in the 1959 Term; Justice Goldberg during the 1962 Term; Justice
O'Connor in the 1999, 2002, and 2005 Terms; Justice Powell during the 1986 Term;
Justice White in the 1971 and 1987 Terms; and Justice Kennedy during the 1996,
1997, and 2006 Terms. See id at 67.
177. Andrew D. Martin, Kevin M. Quinn & Lee Epstein, The Median Justice
on the United States Supreme Court, 83 N.C. L. REV. 1275, 1277 (2005).
178. Peter K. Ens & Patrick C. Wohlfarth, The Swing Justice, 75 J. POL.
1089, 1092 (2013).
179. Id at 1103.
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beings, can no more escape being influenced by public opinion in the long
run than can people working at other jobs.180
Chief Justice Rehnquist concedes that judges must be
influenced by public opinion. Researchers generally agree with this
conclusion."'
More crucially, recent work concludes that in the closely
divided cases, "a significant relationship" only exists between the
preferences of the public and the justice casting the deciding vote.18 2
In other words, public opinion influences the Court's median. And
therein lies the key to solving the puzzle of Justice Kennedy's
curious metamorphosis.
B. Justice Kennedy as Super Median
Constitutional law is whatever the super median says it is,
particularly for the close cases. This is a remarkable power. Writing
in reference to the 2010 Term, Noah Feldman explained:
It is Kennedy's apparent unpredictability -- and his willingness to make
common cause with both factions in different cases -- that is the source of
his overwhelming power in court and country. This year, there have been
nine 5-4 cases; Kennedy has been in the majority every time. (Last year he
was the controlling vote in 12 of 17 cases decided 5-4; the previous year
20 out of 25.)183
This description neatly encapsulates Kennedy's status on the
Court. Justice Kennedy's "unpredictability" is reflected in a wider
preference distribution, which allows him to move among coalitions
180. William H. Rehnquist, Constitutional Law and Public Opinion, 20
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 751, 768 (1986).
181. See Christopher J. Casillas, Peter K. Enns & Patrick C. Wohlfarth, How
Public Opinion Constrains the US. Supreme Court, 55 AM J. POL. Sc. 74 (2011);
Roy B. Flemming & B. Dan Wood, The Public and the Supreme Court: Individual
Justice Responsiveness to American Policy Moods, 41 AM. J. POL. Sc. 468 (1997);
Kevin T. McGuire & James A. Stimson, The Least Dangerous Branch Revisited:
New Evidence on Supreme Court Responsiveness to Public Preferences, 66 J. POL.
1018 (2004); Isaac Unah, Kristen Rosano & K. Dawn Milam, U.S. Supreme Court
Justices and Public Mood, 30 J.L. & POL. 293 (2015). But see JEFFREY A. SEGAL &
HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED
(2002); Micheal W. Giles, Bethany Blackstone & Richard L. Vining, Jr., The
Supreme Court in American Democracy: Unraveling the Linkages Between Public
Opinion and Judicial Decision Making, 70 J. POL. 293 (2008); Helmut Norpoth &
Jeffrey A. Segal, Popular Influence on Supreme Court Decisions, 88 AM. POL. SC.
REV. 711 (1994).
182. See Enns & Wohlfarth, supra note 178, at 1103-04.
183. Feldman, supra note 1.
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within the Court with relative ease. He is part of most narrow
majority coalitions because the gap between his ideological
preferences and those of the justices on either side of him is wide.'8 4
That is the source of Kennedy's power and influence.
This is true of the recently completed 2014 Term. '5 Looking
over the course of the Term, the measure of Justice Kennedy's
influence appears muted. He was on the majority of the Court in 88%
of cases decided.' 86 Justice Breyer led the Court with 92%, and
Justice Sotomayor came in second at 89%. "' If we look only at the
divided cases, Justice Kennedy was in the majority 80% of the time;
Justice Breyer also led the Court here, at 86%, and Justice
Sotomayor was second at 82%.1" But his influence grows if we look
only at the closely divided cases, the 5-4 cases. These are the
difficult cases where the Court often divides along ideological lines,
and where the super medians put their influence to use. Out of
nineteen such cases, Justice Kennedy was in the majority fourteen
times, or 74% percent."'9 More tellingly, he joined the four
conservative Justices in five 5-4 decisions, and the moderate Justices
in eight of these cases.1'o This is true of Justice Kennedy through the
years, his ability to coalesce with both conservative and moderate
coalitions.191
184. See Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point
Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953-1999,
10 POL. ANALYSIS 134 (2002). For the data for the 2014 Term, see Measures,
MARTIN-QUINN SCORES, http://mqscores.berkeley.edu/measures.php (last visited
Nov. 25, 2015).
185. See KEDAR BHATIA, SCOTUSBLOG, STAT PACK FOR OCTOBER TERM
2014, at 23 (Jun. 30, 2015), http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/
2015/07/SBStat_Pack OT14.pdf.
186. Id. at 21.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. See id. at 22.
190. See id.
191. It is important to note that Justice Breyer was also in 74% of the 5-4
cases. See id. at 23. Unlike Kennedy, however, who joins the moderate wing of the
Court eight times, Justice Breyer joins the conservative wing of the Court only once,
in Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378 (2015). See id. at
22. For the remaining five cases, the line-up of the justices does not follow a
discernible pattern. Also, and more importantly, the 2014 Term appears to be an
outlier for Justice Breyer. The prior Term, while Justice Kennedy joined every
single 5-4 decision, Justice Breyer joined only 50% of them. See id. at 23. And the
three Terms before that, he joined 48%, 47%, and 31% of these majorities,
respectively. See id.
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These nineteen cases do not describe the full measure of his
influence. Far more important are the major cases of the Term, what
Bradley Canon terms the "politico-moral" cases.19 2 There were
fourteen major cases. 9 3 Justice Kennedy joined the majority in
twelve of these cases and, interestingly, so did Justice Breyer.'94 But
a closer look at the four cases where they disagreed tells an
important story. Notably, all four were 5-4 decisions. 5 In two of
them, Horne v. Department of Agriculture (the California raisin
growers case)'96 and Glossip v. Gross (the Oklahoma lethal injection
protocol case), 7 the Court followed the classic liberal-conservative
split.' In the other two cases, Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar (a state
ban on campaign funds for judges)" and Walker v. Texas Division,
Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. (the confederate flag on license
plates case), 200 a conservative justice joined the moderate wing of the
Court. 201 In other words, it took two defections from conservative
justices (Justice Thomas in the confederate flag case and the Chief
Justice in the campaign finance case) for Justice Breyer to match
Justice Kennedy. Had the classic ideological lines held, Justice
Kennedy would have been in the majority in every major closely
divided case. Also, while Justice Breyer did not join the conservative
wing of the Court in any closely divided case, Justice Kennedy
joined the moderate wing five times, and with the Chief Justice,
joined the moderates in King v. Burwell, the health care decision.202
This is one easy way to explain Justice Kennedy's apparent
jurisprudential evolution. Justice Kennedy's views are changing
because they can, because his status as super median allows him to
do so. When Justice Kennedy wrote his majority opinion in Miller,
for example, he did so from a position of weakness, in that he needed
to preserve Justice O'Connor's vote within the five-member
majority. The following year, in Bush v. Vera, Justice O'Connor left
no doubt about the centrality of her views in this area, as she both
192. Bradley C. Canon, The Supreme Court as a Cheerleader in Politico-
Moral Disputes, 54 J. POL. 637, 638 (1992).
193. See BHATIA, supra note 185, at 22.
194. Id.
195. See id.
196. 135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015).
197. 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015).
198. See BHATIA, supra note 185, at 22.
199. 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015).
200. 135 S. Ct. 2239 (2015).
201. See BHATIA, supra note 185, at 22.
202. 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015); see BHATIA, supra note 185, at 48.
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wrote a majority opinion for the Court as well as a concurrence to
her own majority.2 0 3 Upon Justice O'Connor's retirement, Justice
Kennedy could finally assert his own views. This is when we see
LULAC, decided the Term following O'Connor's retirement.
In order to appreciate the true nature of Justice Kennedy's
status on the Court, and his ability to coalesce with both conservative
and moderate coalitions, consider the following graph:2 04
SCOrUShog Stat Pack I OctoberTrm 2or 4 Stat Pack [ Tsday, Jne 3o, 205
5-4 Case Majorities
100%
4o% 
,
70
OT95 (J96 Oyq? OT98 OT9g 0oo (fr Ono2 03 OT04 0705 Oo6 (07 OTos 0To OTro 0rii 01712 OT13 OT14
Note first how much the Court tilted to the right up until the
time of Justice O'Connor's retirement. Even those years when
Justice Kennedy or Justice O'Connor was considered a super
median, they joined their moderate colleagues in a very low
percentage of cases. In the 2005 Term, for example, O'Connor
joined her moderate colleagues in approximately 15% of the 5-4
cases, and Justice Kennedy joined his moderate colleagues
approximately 10% of the time in the 1996 Term. There are spikes in
the graph, to be sure-note specifically Justice Kennedy's 1997
Term and O'Connor's 2002 Term-but these are exceptions to the
general voting trend.
203. 517 U.S. 952 (1996).
204. See BHATIA, supra note 185, at 25.
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The real story of this graph is the dramatic change seen in
Justice Kennedy. The first major change happens around the time of
Justice O'Connor's retirement. He went from joining no opinions
with his moderate colleagues during the 2001 and 2002 Terms to
joining them in 25% of the 5-4 decisions. This last Term, Kennedy
joined them in 42% of these cases. And more remarkable still, the
number of closely divided cases he joined with his conservative
colleagues dipped in turn. This past Term, in fact, he joined them
26% of the time. The evolution in Justice Kennedy's behavior on the
Court is clear. It corroborates the insight that super medians may be
as flexible and inconsistent as they wish to be. In fact, to be a super
median means precisely that, the independence to join one's
colleagues as needed. In Justice Kennedy's case, it demonstrates the
ability to adapt in order to remain in control of the Court's decision-
making. This is LULAC. This is also Parents Involved.
As a super median, Justice Kennedy enjoys much freedom to
expound on his particular constitutional vision. Super medians can
do as they wish because any winning coalition must include their
votes in the final tally. This is where idiosyncratic legal theories take
hold and unorthodox readings of legal texts receive an honest
hearing. According to his critics, this is a fit description of Justice
Kennedy. As Feldman writes, "Justice Kennedy is different. His
opinions tend to be grounded on strong statements of principle. Yet
many find his tacking from right to left mystifying, frustrating and
unpredictable. They question what consistent principles could guide
such apparently disparate conclusions, and hint darkly at incoherence
or self-aggrandizement." 20 5 This is one way to explain Justice
Kennedy's shift: as a reflection of the independence afforded by his
status as super median. The argument of the previous section
complicates matters a bit.
I agree with Lyle Denniston that Justice Kennedy "is the virtual
embodiment of the tendencies of the Roberts Court." 20 6 I might also
agree, to a point, with Noah Feldman when he writes that this is
"Justice Anthony Kennedy's country -- the rest of us just live in
it." 20 7 Once we consider that public opinion is keenly felt on the
205. Feldman, supra note 1.
206. Lyle Denniston, Term Review: A More Activist Court, SCOTUSBLOG
(June 30, 2011, 5:08 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/06/term-review-a-more-
activist-court/.
207. Feldman, supra note 1; Lyle Denniston, The "Kennedy Court, " Only
More So, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 9, 2010, 6:49 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/
2010/04/the-kennedy-court-only-more-so/.
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swing justice, however, these statements take on a different light.
Justice Kennedy's apparent metamorphosis on questions of race is a
reflection of the conflicted way that public opinion views these
questions. These are not easy questions. Justice Kennedy's evolving
views are implicitly recognizing that fact.
III. WHY IT MATTERS: LAW, THEORY, AND THE FATE OF THE
SECOND RECONSTRUCTION
As a super median, Justice Kennedy is free and independent to
decide cases as idiosyncratically as he wishes to decide them, subject
to the constraints of public opinion. This is why we witness a shift in
his views on race, from an uncompromising stance in his early years
on the Court and through 2003, to a more flexible and contextual
approach beginning around 2006. The implications of this shift are
far-reaching. The implications for constitutional litigation are
obvious: For the politico-moral cases,2 0 8 those cases that grab the
public's attention and energize the culture wars, the vote of Justice
Kennedy is crucial. Such is the life of a super median. In turn, the
implications for constitutional theory directly follow; this is the
countermajoritarian difficulty on steroids. Is it possible to defend the
notion that a single justice can determine some of the most important
constitutional questions of his generation? The final Section
examines the implications of this question for constitutional law
generally and, in so doing, makes this abstract question more
concrete. This is the question of the constitutionality of the Voting
Rights Act, the "crown jewel" of the civil rights movement. Is the
constitutionality of the Act in the hands of Justice Kennedy?
Assuming that Justice Kennedy retains his status as super median, so
that he remains independent to consult his newfound domains
jurisprudence, how is he likely to answer this question?
A. Constitutional Litigation
Justice Kennedy's status as super median has obvious
implications for constitutional litigation. As the one justice whose
vote must form part of any majority coalition, litigators must pay
undue attention to Justice Kennedy's preferences. This makes for
208. Bradley Canon defines politico-moral cases as those controversies
where "the disputants approach policy questions not in terms of political wisdom or
experience, but in nonpolitical terms of absolute right or wrong." Canon, supra note
192, at 638.
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challenging strategizing. Justice Kennedy's wide preference
distribution-his known "unpredictability"-makes the task of
predicting his vote difficult. But there are clues.
The first basic step is to focus on the "constitutional domain"20 9
in question. Context matters. On this view, LULAC was not a case
about Latinos and their nascent political power but, rather, about the
First Amendment, political agency, and expression. Similarly, "[j]ury
service is an exercise of responsible citizenship by all members of
the community, including those who otherwise might not have the
opportunity to contribute to our civic life."21 0 Even when peremptory
challenges are used by private litigants, though protecting a private
interest, "the objective of jury selection proceedings is to determine
representation on a governmental body." 2 11 And in Lee v. Weisman,
which involved the deliverance by a rabbi of prayer during a high
school graduation ceremony,2 12 Justice Kennedy described the event
as follows:
Graduation is a time for family and those closest to the student to celebrate
success and express mutual wishes of gratitude and respect, all to the end
of impressing upon the young person the role that it is his or her right and
duty to assume in the community and all of its diverse parts. 2 13
To the answer that a student is always free to miss the
graduation ceremony, and so no coercion is involved by the state,
Justice Kennedy responded that "[1]aw reaches past formalism. And
to say a teenage student has a real choice not to attend her high
school graduation is formalistic in the extreme. . . . Everyone knows
that in our society and in our culture high school graduation is one of
life's most significant occasions." 2 14 The similarity in the analysis to
Parents Involved and LULAC is unmistakable.
Whether public schools, questions of political association and
identity, or prison reform, Justice Kennedy is moved and influenced
by "strategic and case-specific considerations." 2 15 This is precisely
how median justices behave. What we see from Justice Kennedy is
in line with the way researchers understand the median justice.
The next step is more challenging. Once a particular domain is
identified, litigators must try to assess the proper principles that
209. See Gerken, supra note 38, at 106.
210. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 402 (1991).
211. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 626 (1991).
212. 505 U.S. 577, 581 (1992).
213. Id. at 595.
214. Id.
215. See Enns & Wohlfarth, supra note 178, at 1092.
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govern the particular domain.2 1 6 Professor Gerken identifies the
principles that govern the public school and political association
domains in Justice Kennedy's constitutional world.2 1 7 But she does so
by cobbling together bits and pieces from Justice Kennedy's written
opinions.2 1 8 It is much harder to identify similar principles without
the benefit of Kennedy's written accounts. Looking to the future, the
task is to identify what those principles may be. I discuss three
leading principles.2 19
The first principle-and here Justice Kennedy is channeling his
inner-Brennan and Walter Murphy220-is the concept of human
dignity.2 2 ' In the recent Brown v. Plata, the California prison case,22 2
Justice Kennedy wrote for a sharply divided Court that "[p]risoners
retain the essence of human dignity inherent in all persons. Respect
for that dignity animates the Eighth Amendment prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment."2 2 3 Justice Kennedy has deployed this
argument in myriad cases and contexts, from the anti-sodomy
statutes in Lawrence v. Texas224 and the abortion laws in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey22 5  to
congressional restrictions on partial-birth abortions2 2 6 and even suits
against states in state courts for money damages, even when the
states have broken federal law.22 7 This is also true, more recently, in
Shelby County v. Holder, a moment in the Court's history when the
conservative majority let its imagination run free, striking down
important portions of a super-statute under the guise of state dignity
and an imagined "equality of States" doctrine.2 2 8 The lesson is clear:
216. See Gerken, supra note 38, at 126.
217. See id.
218. See id. at 108-22.
219. See Feldman, supra note 1.
220. See William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States:
Contemporary Ratifieation, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 433, 433 (1986); Walter F. Murphy,
An Ordering of Constitutional Values, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 703, 758 (1980) ("The
fundamental value that constitutionalism protects is human dignity.").
221. See Feldman, supra note 1.
222. 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011).
223. Id. at 1928.
224. See 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003).
225. See 505 U.S. 833, 851-52 (1992).
226. See Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 157 (2007) (noting that the
congressional ban "expresse[d] respect for the dignity of human life").
227. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 711-12, 749 (1999).
228. See Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 10, at 483-84, 484 n.9
(2014) (citation omitted); Joseph Fishkin, The Dignity of the South, 123 YALE L.J.
ONLINE 175, 175-76 (2013), http://www.yalelawjoumal.org/pdf/1174_iyst6fvo.pdf.
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"Anyone who wants to win his vote would do well to argue that
someone's dignity is being violated somewhere." 2 29
The second principle is the jealous protection of the authority
of the judiciary to interpret the Constitution.2 3 0 Justice Kennedy is
clearly a judicial supremacist, and this is true across myriad settings
and contexts. The classic exposition of this principle appears in City
of Boerne v. Flores, a case where Kennedy appeared miffed that
Congress had attempted to overrule a judicial interpretation of a
substantive constitutional provision. 2 31 According to Kennedy, this
principle dated as far back as the founding and the canonical
Marbury v. Madison.2 3 2 This was something Congress could not
do.23 3 The principle was also present in Plata; Kennedy's opinion for
the Court came only after years of litigation and the disregard by
state prison officials of court orders demanding prison reform.2 34 This
is also the wrongful districting cases,2 3 5 and particularly Miller v.
Johnson, a case where the Court worries that the DOJ is interpreting
the Voting Rights Act unconstitutionally.2 3 6 Justice Kennedy and his
brethren make clear that the Court is in charge of constitutional
questions.237
This is a marked change from the Court's posture dating to the
time of the Warren Court. Then, the Court happily deferred to the
political branches on questions of congressional powers. 2 38 This is
South Carolina v. Katzenbach;239 this is also Katzenbach v.
Morgan.2 40 As Shelby County makes clear, this is not the
conservative wing of the Roberts Court.
229. See Feldman, supra note 1.
230. See id.
231. 521 U.S. 507, 514-15, 519 (1997).
232. Id. at 529 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177
(1803)).
233. See id. at 519.
234. See Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1922-23 (2011).
235. See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993); Pamela S. Karlan, Our
Separatism? Voting Rights as an American Nationalities Policy, 1995 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 83, 90-91.
236. 515 U.S. 900, 903, 905-06 (1995).
237. See id. at 912.
238. Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Understanding the Paradoxical Case of the
Voting Rights Act, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 697, 715 (2009).
239. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
240. 384 U.S. 641 (1966); see Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer,
The Voting Rights Act in Winter: The Death of a Superstatute, 100 IowA L. REV.
1389, 1401-02 (2015); see also Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 238, at 715-16 ("The
Morgan case must be understood for what it was: a moment in time when the Court
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A third principle is a healthy, if selective, distrust of the
political branches and the lengths to which they will go to protect
themselves.2 4 ' This principle is straight out of the political process
school. This is an important part of the story in Bush v. Gore, as the
Court worries about a rogue state court changing the rules of the
game in order to elect the state court's preferred candidate.24 2 This is
also LULAC, a case best explained as a reaction to the process by
which Texas sought to change the rules of the game mid-census.24 3
More recently, this is Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona
Independent Redistricting Commission, which upheld Arizona's
ballot initiative establishing an independent congressional
redistricting commission in the face of contrary constitutional
language under the Elections Clause.2" And similarly, this is also
Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, a challenge to the
state's reapportionment plan.2 4 5 This case reminds me of LULAC in
reference to Justice Kennedy's vote. The majority appears to go out
of its way to decide this case, in the face of what the principal dissent
considers to be insurmountable procedural obstacles.24 6
There are limits to this distrust, of course. The easiest case for
judicial intervention as a political process question might be the
political gerrymandering arena. This is an area where politicians get
away with a lot, yet the Court refuses to intervene, feigning an
inability to discern judicially manageable standards. Justice Kennedy
holds the controlling vote here. He is yet to find such a standard and
is still in search of a surgical approach to the area, akin to the Court's
intervention in the one person, one vote revolution. Justice Kennedy
misunderstands this history, for the Court was not as surgical and
modest as he might think; at different times, the Court declared
almost all state legislatures and the United States House of
Representatives unconstitutional.2 4 7 This is not the behavior of a
ceded some of its traditional power to define the substantive scope of the
Constitution to Congress and its own power to enforce the Constitution.").
241. See Feldman, supra note 1.
242. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
243. See Charles, supra note 41.
244. 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2659 (2015).
245. 135 S. Ct. 1257 (2015).
246. Id. at 1275 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
247. See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 20 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
("I had not expected to witness the day when the Supreme Court of the United States
would render a decision which casts grave doubt on the constitutionality of the
composition of the House of Representatives."); Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen.
Assembly of Colo., 377 U.S. 713, 746 (1964) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (criticizing
1 51 1
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modest and passive institution. Also, the reapportionment revolution
leads inexorably from the equipopulation cases to the political
gerrymandering cases. They are two sides of the same coin. More
importantly as an institutional question, if the Court is able and
willing to regulate the redistricting arena in the name of
representative fairness, or campaign finance regulation-which is yet
another example of distrust of the political branches-the Court
could certainly handle the political gerrymandering area. But that's
an argument for another day.
Looking ahead, the lessons of this argument are both clear and
unsurprising: Litigants must pay close attention to Justice Kennedy's
particularities and subtleties. It matters whether the issue is voluntary
school integration plans or political gerrymandering, prison reform
or the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act, and it also matters
how Kennedy interprets these various contexts. This is hardly news.
Far more interesting and important are the implications of this
argument for constitutional theory and the Bickelian challenge. This
is the subject of the next Section.
B. Constitutional Theory and the Bickelian Challenge
Writing in the early 1960s, and undoubtedly influenced by the
perceived excesses of the Warren Court, Alexander Bickel offered
his influential charge against the institution of judicial review. 2 48 This
was the famed "counter-majoritarian difficulty." 2 4 9 In his words:
[W]hen the Supreme Court declares unconstitutional a legislative act or
the action of an elected executive, it thwarts the will of representatives of
the actual people of the here and now; it exercises control, not in behalf of
the prevailing majority, but against it. This, without mystic overtones, is
what actually happens. . . . [I]t is the reason the charge can be made that
judicial review is undemocratic. 250
Reynolds and its companion cases for declaring "unconstitutional the legislatures of
most of the 50 States").
248. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16 (Vail-Ballou Press, Inc., 2d ed. 1986)
(1962).
249. Id at 16-17.
250. Id; HENRY STEELE COMMAGER, MAJORITY RULE AND MINORITY RIGHTS
55 (1958) ("Whatever the logical support for the theory [of judicial review], it
cannot be found in the philosophy of democracy if by democracy we mean majority
rule; whatever the practical justification, it cannot be found in the defense of
fundamental rights against the assault of misguided or desperate majorities.").
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The claim is ultimately about accountability and democratic
pedigree. Supreme Court justices are unelected political actors,
granted life tenure in order to render them independent by design.
Their democratic pedigree is decidedly low. In contrast, the
democratic pedigree of elected officials is concomitantly high. They
are accountable to the electorate and must be cognizant of public
opinions or else face the consequences in the next election.
Whatever one thinks about the straight-forward simplicity of
the argument, it remains true that Bickel's charge dominated
constitutional scholarship almost from the time that Bickel issued his
challenge.2 5 1 Some argue that it still does.2 52 The response, in fact, is
said to border on an "obsession. "253
As a general matter, the claim is not terribly interesting, nor is
it descriptively accurate. For all the noise that surrounds Bickel's
famed difficulty, it is still true that the Court is seldom out of step
with public opinion for long.2 54 The appointment process ensures as
251. See Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries
and the Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 712 (1995) ("[R]esponding to the
countermajoritarian difficulty has been an important staple on the menu of
constitutional theory since the appearance of Bickel's influential book."); Robert M.
Cover, The Origins of Judicial Activism in the Protection of Minorities, 91 YALE
L.J. 1287, 1288 n.2 (1982) ("The 'counter-majoritarian difficulty' has spawned the
central line of constitutional scholarship for the last thirty years."); see also Croley,
supra, at 712 n.66 (documenting some of the many published acknowledgments to
Bickel's influence).
252. See Suzanna Sherry, Too Clever by Half The Problem with Novelty in
Constitutional Law, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 921, 921 (2001) ("[T]he 'counter-
majoritarian difficulty' remains-some forty years after its christening-a central
theme in constitutional scholarship. Indeed, one might say that reconciling judicial
review and democratic institutions is the goal of almost every major constitutional
scholar writing today. . . ." (footnote omitted)).
253. See Mark A. Graber, The Countermajoritarian Dififculty: From Courts
to Congress to Constitutional Order, 4 ANN. REV. L. & Soc. Sci. 361, 380 (2008);
Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153, 155 (2002).
254. See, e.g., David G. Barnum, The Supreme Court and Public Opinion:
Judicial Decision Making in the Post-New Deal Period, 47 J. POL. 652, 662 (1985)
("[T]he judicial activism of the post-New Deal Supreme Court was in fact
surprisingly consistent with majoritarian principles."); Robert A. Dahl, Decision-
Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB.
L. 279, 285 (1957) ("The fact is, then, that the policy views dominant on the Court
are never for long out of line with the policy views dominant among the lawmaking
majorities of the United States."). See generally THOMAS R. MARSHALL, PUBLIC
OPINION AND THE SUPREME COURT (1989); Flemming & Wood, supra note 181;
Michael W. Link, Tracking Public Mood in the Supreme Court: Cross-Time
Analyses of Criminal Procedure and Civil Rights Cases, 48 POL. RES. Q. 61 (1995);
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much.255 To be sure, the Court is not a majoritarian institution in
every case, 2 56 but this is hardly an indictment on the institution. The
fact that the Court can stand against public opinion is an interesting
question in its own right, but that is not the question that Bickel
asked.257
For my purposes, the example of Justice Kennedy as super
median indicts the institution of judicial review in a far more
important and revealing way. It is hard enough to justify as a
normative matter-though not impossible-granting the Supreme
Court the power to overrule the present wishes of elected officials on
the basis of vague and imprecise constitutional language. Bickel got
this much right. But could anyone defend granting one justice the
power to decide some of the most difficult and contested questions of
public policy in a country of well over 300 million people? Put
differently, how does one defend Justice Kennedy's role on the Court
as super median?
This is an arresting claim. Consider in this vein Justice
Kennedy's recent shift on questions of race. This Article argues that
the best way to explain it is by looking to Kennedy's newfound
status as super median, which in turn allowed him to contextualize
William Mishler & Reginald S. Sheehan, The Supreme Court as a
Countermajoritarian Institution? The Impact of Public Opinion on Supreme Court
Decisions, 87 AM. POL. Sc. REv. 87 (1993); James A. Stimson, Michael B.
Mackuen & Robert S. Erikson, Dynamic Representation, 89 AM. POL. Sc. REv. 543
(1995). Legal scholars reach a similar conclusion. See, e.g., Barry Friedman,
Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REv. 577, 609 (1993) ("[C]ontrary to
laments about the countermajoritarian difficulty, even controversial judicial
decisions often are majoritarian."); Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights
and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REv. 1, 7 (1996) ("The Supreme Court
does not play the strong countermajoritarian role in defense of individual liberties
that popular wisdom ascribes to it.").
255. See Dahl, supra note 254, at 284-85. See generally GLENDON
SCHUBERT, THE CONSTITUTIONAL POLITY (1970); Norpoth & Segal, supra note 181;
Jeffrey A. Segal, Measuring Change on the Supreme Court: Examining Alternative
Models, 29 AM. J. POL. Sd. 461 (1985). Influential legal scholars agree. See, e.g.,
Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAw 3, 47 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997)
("If the Courts are free to write the Constitution anew, they will, by God, write it the
way the majority wants; the appointment and confirmation process will see to
that.").
256. See MARSHALL, supra note 254, at 55.
257. For a recent revitalization of the Bickelian challenge as a moral claim,
see Richard H. Pildes, Is the Supreme Court a "Majoritarian" Institution?, 2010
SUP. CT. REV. 103.
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his jurisprudence accordingly in domain-like fashion. Justice
Kennedy is now able to explore his views about public schools, the
crafting of district lines as politically associative practices protected
by the First Amendment, or the role that the concept of human
dignity must play in decision-making. The Constitution is whatever
Justice Kennedy says it is, irrespective of text, history, precedent, or
even Justice Kennedy's own views on the matter.2 58 It is a brave new
world, but that is precisely the world of the super median.
This is a remarkable power. It is also unjustifiable. Justice
Kennedy's position on the Court, and his recent shift, offer an
inimitable example of attitudinalist jurisprudence and its perils. To
see more clearly the implications of this view, the next Section turns
to a more concrete example. This is the ongoing debate over the
constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act.
C. Constitutional Law and the Challenge to the Second
Reconstruction
To this day, the Voting Rights Act stands as the clearest
example of our national commitment to eradicating racial
discrimination from the political process. The problem at hand had
proven quite difficult, even intractable. Dating back to the late
nineteenth century, jurisdictions throughout the South
institutionalized the mass disenfranchisement of otherwise eligible
black voters.2 59 This condition endured unabated for well over half a
century. When Congress finally faced up to the problem, it could
only do so from a position of weakness so long as southern
congressmen held together. The resulting legislation-the Civil
Rights Acts of 1957, 1960, and 1964-reflected this weakness. The
best the legislation could do was open up the federal courts to
adjudicate claims of racial discrimination in voting. But such a
response proved no match for the ingenuity and recalcitrance of
defiant southern jurisdictions. A stronger response was needed.
This was the Voting Rights Act of 1965.260 The success of the
Act can be attributed to the fact that it radically shifted basic legal
258. In saying this, I do not intend to suggest that the relevant publics
acquiesce to whatever the Court chooses to impose on them. The question of judicial
impact is far more complicated than that, yet underappreciated.
259. See generally J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN
POLITICS: SUFFRAGE RESTRICTION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTY
SOUTH, 1880-1910 (1974).
260. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437.
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burdens and presumptions. Under prior law, the federal government
must come to local courts and carry its burden of showing the
unconstitutionality of the laws under review. In other words, the laws
were presumed constitutional unless and until the federal
government could prove otherwise in open court. Under the Voting
Rights Act, however, any voting law enacted by jurisdictions
covered by § 4 of the Act is presumed to be unconstitutional until the
federal government determines otherwise. 2 61 These covered
jurisdictions were also subject to the appointment of poll watchers
and voting registrars. No longer would the voting rights of voters of
color be subject to the whims of local registrars and state and local
governments.
Almost as soon as President Johnson signed the bill into law,
South Carolina challenged the constitutionality of the new law.
Unremarkably, in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, the Supreme Court
sided with the overwhelming national coalition that supported the
law.262 In an opinion authored by Chief Justice Warren, the Court
concluded that the Act was a rational response to a problem that had
plagued the country for generations.263 The Court was deferring to
congressional wishes, to be sure, but this was no run-of-the-mill
rationality review. Having myriad testimony and congressional
findings at its disposal, the Court made use of them all, as if to
justify the aggressive nature of the new law.264 This approach to
constitutional review did not sit well with Justice Brennan. 265 In notes
he wrote to the Chief Justice on the margins of the first circulated
draft of the opinion, Brennan questioned the need to include any
266enareference to legislative findings in the opinion. Justice Brennan
was looking to the future. To be sure, the record in support of the
Voting Rights Act was robust and exemplary. He knew that the
Court would not always have access to such a record.
History has bome out Brennan's critique. In the very next
case-Katzenbach v. Morgan2 6 7-the Court faced a similarly difficult
261. § 4, 79 Stat. at 438.
262. 383 U.S. 301, 337 (1966).
263. Id.
264. See id. at 308-09.
265. See Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Legislative Findings, Congressional Powers,
and the Future of the Voting Rights Act, 82 IND. L.J. 99, 103 (2007); Guy-Uriel E.
Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, State's Rights, Last Rites, and Voting Rights, 47
CONN. L. REV. 481, 505-06 (2014).
266. See id.
267. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
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constitutional question: Assuming the constitutionality of the literacy
test,2 68 could Congress prohibit the denial of the right to vote to a
person who completed a sixth-grade education in Puerto Rico
(presumably an education in Spanish) due to her inability to read or
write English?2 6 9 The answer could not be clearer: Congress could
presumably not do so unless it could show, as in South Carolina, that
the state law was racially discriminatory.2 70 But there was only one
problem, which Justice Harlan was happy to point out in dissent:
Congress had proffered no findings in support of this provision.2 71
Not a one. This was nothing more than a "legislative announcement"
that the law in question violated equal protection principles.2 72 In
writing the opinion for the Court, Justice Brennan must thus rely on
traditional rational basis review, the kind that places few if any
demands on legislatures. And that is precisely what he did. In the
face of a barren record, he wrote, for example, that "§ 4(e) may be
viewed as a measure to secure for the Puerto Rican community
residing in New York nondiscriminatory treatment by government-
both in the imposition of voting qualifications and the provision or
administration of governmental services, such as public schools,
public housing and law enforcement."2 73 The Court was not about to
engage in a review of a non-existent record, so it was left to argue
that "[i]t is not for us to review the congressional resolution of these
factors. It is enough that we be able to perceive a basis upon which
the Congress might resolve the conflict as it did."2 7 4 This was
rationality "review" by name only.
Justice Brennan's concerns took on added significance through
the years. While upholding the constitutionality of the Act, the Court
would often highlight facts on the record to support its decision. In
City of Rome v. United States,275 for example, the Court offered the
following:
268. See Lassiter v. Northampton Cty. Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 50
(1959).
269. See Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 643-44.
270. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 333-34 (1966).
271. Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 669 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("There is simply
no legislative record supporting such hypothesized discrimination of the sort we
have hitherto insisted upon when congressional power is brought to bear on
constitutionally reserved state concerns.").
272. Id.
273. Id. at 652 (majority opinion).
274. Id. at 653.
275. 446 U.S. 156 (1980).
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In considering the 1975 extension, Congress acknowledged that largely
as a result of the Act, Negro voter registration had improved dramatically
since 1965. Congress determined, however, that "a bleaker side of the
picture yet exists." Significant disparity persisted between the percentages
of whites and Negroes registered in at least several of the covered
jurisdictions. In addition, though the number of Negro elected officials had
increased since 1965, most held only relatively minor positions, none held
statewide office, and their number in the state legislatures fell far short of
being representative of the number of Negroes residing in the covered
jurisdictions. Congress concluded that, because minority political progress
under the Act, though "undeniable," had been "modest and spotty,"
extension of the Act was warranted.27 6
This is now an accepted axiom in our constitutional law, that
Congress's enforcement powers must be exercised only when
supported by an adequate record. This is the central teaching of City
of Boerne v. Flores.2 7 7 But to suggest that this requirement began
with City of Boerne is to be blind to the lessons of history. Justice
Brennan could foresee this outcome a generation before.
This is where we find ourselves today. In Shelby County, the
Court began the expected dismantling of the Voting Rights Act. The
case exalted the indignity of subjecting the covered jurisdictions-
and only the covered jurisdictions-to the Act's preclearance
271
regime. With preclearance essentially out of the way, the next step
was obvious: § 2 of the Act, which enforces the substantive core of
the Fifteenth Amendment through a disparate impact test. This is a
difficult question because the Court has interpreted the substantive
provisions of that Amendment as enshrining an intent test. This
would be a challenge to the constitutionality of the Second
Reconstruction more generally, as myriad statutes enforce the
substantive component of the Reconstruction Amendments with a
disparate impact analysis. A related question will look for answers to
Justice Scalia's challenge: Is the effort by state and private actors to
avoid disparate impact liability in itself a species of discrimination
actionable under the Fourteenth Amendment's equality principle? 279
276. Id. at 180-81 (citations omitted).
277. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
278. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013).
279. See Ricci v. Destefano, 557 U.S. 557, 594 (2009) (Scalia, J.,
concurring). For a discussion that argues that Ricci suggests precisely this reading,
among others, see Helen Norton, The Supreme Court's Post-Racial Turn Towards a
Zero-Sum Understanding of Equality, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 197, 229 (2010);
Richard Primus, The Future of Disparate Impact, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1341, 1344
(2010).
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And then came Inclusive Communities Project. In an opinion
authored by Justice Kennedy, the Court upheld a long-standing
reading of the Federal Housing Act as incorporating a disparate
impact test.2 80 I do not want to read too much into this case, as
everything Justice Kennedy gave in the beginning of the opinion he
took away at the end. He is not a full-blown liberal quite yet. But in
light of our expectations prior to the case and what we took to be the
continued demise of the Second Reconstruction, one case at a time, it
is hard not to read the opinion as a respite from Shelby County. The
Second Reconstruction might even be safe for now. How to explain
it?
One answer returns to the central point of the Article: As a
super median, Justice Kennedy pays attention to public preferences
and the real-life impact of his decisions. He is not ready, as the
nation is not ready, for the Second Reconstruction to end. Another
answer is that, quite simply, the dignitary interests present in Shelby
County are not present in the disparate impact analysis. Shelby
County, as with the preclearance regime, may be sui generis.
A third answer looks to the specific context of the decided
cases. In Shelby County, Justice Kennedy could look to the voter
registration and turnout figures and be comforted by the fact that
much has improved.2 8 ' The same cannot be said for housing, as rapid
suburbanization has moved the country away from the problems that
the Kerner Commission Report flagged generations ago. The dream
of an integrated society remains a dream. Or as Justice Kennedy put
it in his concurring opinion in Parents Involved, Justice Harlan's
paean to the colorblind principle in his Plessy dissent remains an
elusive ideal.2 82 "In the real world," Justice Kennedy wrote, "it is
regrettable to say, it cannot be a universal constitutional principle."2 8 3
Whether rightly or wrongly, it stands to reason that the same "real
world" that led Justice Kennedy to soften his views in Parents
Involved led him to soften them in the context of housing. After all,
as in Parents Involved, "the problem before us defies so easy a
solution."2 8 4 This is another way of saying that if the recent past is
280. Tex. Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc.,
135 S. Ct. 2507, 2525-26 (2015).
281. Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2618-22, 2626-27.
282. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S.
701, 788 (2007) (Kennedy, J. concurring).
283. Id.
284. See id.
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any indication, both context and history should lead Justice Kennedy
to uphold the constitutionality of the Second Reconstruction.
CONCLUSION
The fate of the Second Reconstruction rests in the hands of
Justice Kennedy. At first glance, this is a concern for anybody who
cares about racial justice. But Justice Kennedy's recent
jurisprudential turn on questions of race, which this Article explains
by pointing to his status on the Court as a super median, is
encouraging. This is an encouraging turn not because Justice
Kennedy will ultimately reach the right answers to these questions,
whatever those answers may be, but because he is turning away from
the crass formalism on questions of race that exemplified his early
jurisprudence. These are difficult questions, and Justice Kennedy is
giving them their due attention.
